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Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, which
cantly more rapid.
made the acceptance and application of the Agency comprehensive
In the last chapter of his book, the author suggests monitoring and ver
safeguards a mandatory provision for non nuclear weapon states
ification procedures for the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT),
party to the NPT. In addition, the nuclear weapon states party to the
which is to be negotiated within the framework of the Geneva
treaty have concluded, with the IAEA, voluntary offer agreements by
Conference on Disarmament, as well as proposes some approaches to
which their civilian nuclear activities were placed under international
transparency and verification measures for nuclear weapons reduction
safeguards.
and their eventual elimination.
The safeguards have been applied on a regional basis as well, in coun
Finally, Ambassador Timerbaev offers his suggestions and views about
tries that participate in Euratom and in those that have joined the
a nuclear weapon free world under the comprehensive international
nuclear weapon free zones in various regions of the world. A major
control of atomic energy.
effort to expand nuclear monitoring was undertaken in 1996, when the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was concluded. The treaty provides
for a global network of seismic, radionuclide, hydro acoustic and The book contains the following chapters and sub sections:
infrasound stations, as well as for on site inspections. The treaty has
Preface
been signed by the vast majority of states and ratified by almost a hun
dred. It has not yet entered into force since only 31 of the 44 states that Chapter I. Origin of the Idea for International Control of Atomic
have a capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons have ratified it. Energy
Among the remaining states, which have not ratified the treaty, are the Realization of the Military Danger and Political Consequences
U.S., China, India, Pakistan and Israel. Resulting from the Discovery of Atomic Energy
The Russian American treaties for limiting and reducing intermedi Idea of International Control of Atomic Energy
ate range and strategic offensive nuclear arms (the INF Treaty,
Beginning of the Nuclear Era
START 1 Treaty and the new Moscow Treaty of May 24, 2002) also
have extensive provisions for mutual verification. The transparency Attempts by Some U.S. Politicians and Scientists to Encourage Direct
and verification procedures apply, however, to launchers and delivery U.S. Soviet Contact on the Nuclear Issue
vehicles rather than to nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding that, these Soviet Atomic Project
agreements have at least some auxiliary procedures for radiation mon
itoring of nuclear warheads.
Chapter II. Consideration by the UN in the 1940s of Plans for
Over the last decade, both the United States and Russia have accumu
Establishing International Control of Atomic Energy
lated a rich and diverse store of experience in the practical application
of transparency (some call it «natural transparency»), which occurs as Establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission
Summary
366 367
U.S. Plan for International Control etc.). His last post was as Permanent Representative to the IAEA and
to other international organizations in Vienna. In 1992 2002 he was a
USSR Proposal for the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons
consultant to the IAEA for nuclear nonproliferation affairs. Prior to
Work of the UN Atomic Energy Commission and especially since his retirement in 1992, he has been teaching and
writing about nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Among his
United Kingdom’s Attitude to the Baruch Plan
major publications are «Peaceful Atom on International Arena»
Approach of France to International Control
(1969), «Verification of Arms Control and Disarmament» (1983),
End of the U.S. Atomic Monopoly «Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and
Regimes,» 1994 Edition (co author), «Russia and Nuclear
Soviet Scientists and International Control
Nonproliferation» (1999), «Nuclear Suppliers Group: Why and How
it Was Created» (2000), «Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S. Russian
Chapter III. Existing Systems for Nuclear Control Relations: Challenges and Opportunities» (co author, 2002) and text
book «Nuclear Nonproliferation» (co author, 2002). At present, Dr.
IAEA System of Safeguards
Timerbaev is the Executive Council Chair and a senior advisor at the
Regional Systems of Safeguards PIR Center for Policy Studies in Moscow.
International Monitoring of the Nuclear Test Ban
Verification of Bilateral USSR/Russia U.S. Agreements for the
Limiting and Reduction of Strategic Arms
Practical Transparency Activities


Chapter IV. Prospects for Establishing International Verification for
the Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Verification of the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT)
Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Weapons Reduction and
Elimination
International Monitoring and Verification in a Nuclear Weapon Free
World


Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
Summary


Ambassador Roland M. Timerbaev was a professional diplomat for
over 40 years. During most of his time in the diplomatic service, he
served as an arms control negotiator (NPT, ABM Treaty, CTBT,
02184 30.06.2000. 31.03.2003.
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