as a sort of exercise after the author has shown the reader how to do something. Interestingly, some
of the techniques of subdivision found in the Distributio had been in use since ancient Egyptian
times. As is well known, Egyptian arithmetic used parts (what we would today call fractions) of
the type 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 and so on, the only exception being 2/3. This also meant that each part which
was not 2/3 and did not have one as a denominator had to be expressed in terms of the sum of
ā˜recognisedā™ fractions. For instance, 3/5 was denoted by 1/2 plus 1/10, but could also be denoted by
1/5 plus 1/5 plus 1/5. As in the case of Maecianusā™ ā˜unequalā™ subdivision of the as, there were several
alternative sequences for each fraction, some of which seem to have been preferred to others. Part
of the calculatorā™s skill, and thus of the training he received, consisted in doing these sums and in
choosing from among the many alternatives the one best suited to the purpose, see Gillings (1972)
45ā“50; Harrauer and Sijpesteijn (1985) 151ā“64.
53 See Frayn (1993) 108ā“14, 123; Corti (2001), both with further references. Particularly interesting is the
mensa ponderaria from Pompeii (CIL 10.793), which is inscribed with Latin indications of measures
and weights but still shows traces of the previous, Oscan, measures, which have been erased.
54 E.g., CIL 9.2854 (from Histonium in Puglia, no date given); CIL 10.6017 (Minturno, ca. ce 40);
CIL 11.6375 (Pesaro, no date given) ā“ all three refer to the supervision of metrological standards in
Maecianusā™ monetary pamphlet for Marcus 219
buyer tampers with the publicly agreed measurements of wine, corn, or
anything else, or deceives with malicious intention, he is sentenced to a
ļ¬ne double the value of the thing in question; and it was decreed by the
deiļ¬ed Hadrian that those who had falsiļ¬ed weights or measures should be
exiled to an islandā™.55
In sum, the Distributio can be seen against a wider background of metro-
logical texts and indeed objects: it is part of a strong interest in standardis-
ation, which I take to mean establishing a stable connection between thing
and measure. Once a standard is set in place, the universe of inscription
devices can be considered self-sufļ¬cient and self-referential, reality with its
messiness and disorder can be black-boxed, information can be effectively
stored, communicated and transported. The process is not simple, and is
never completely successful: it always appears to be the fruit of negotiations
between Romeā™s present and her eventful past, and between the different
cultures present within the empire and the allegedly dominant one.
th e treatis e i n a leg a l contex t
Another interesting context for the Distributio is offered by contempo-
rary legal literature. Hadrian and Antoninus Pius gave great importance to
overhauling the bureaucracy, and reorganising jurisprudence. Maecianusā™
experience both as administrator and as jurist puts him in a privileged
position as observer and participant in this process. Unfortunately, his own
contributions to the law are no longer extant in their original form, hav-
ing been selected and collected in Justinianā™s Digest.56 Some fragments are,
however, rather revealing. In one of them, Maecianus refers to the rationale
(ratio) underlying a decision: ā˜Slaves who are pre-adolescent are excepted
. . . But the legate Trebius Germanus ordered even a pre-adolescent to be
executed, and yet not without reasonā™. This has been seen as an appeal
to the common ā˜principleā™ or even ā˜rationalityā™ at the basis of law and
administration, which is held to be more cogent than rules explicitly laid
down.57 Again, Maecianus wrote on the lex Falcidia, which granted free
terms of aequitas. For an example from the Greek world cf. IG V, 1.1156 (from Gythium in Laconia,
second century ce).
55 Modestinus (third century ce) in Dig., 48.10.32. See also Paul (early third century ce) in Dig. 4.3.3
and Ulpian (early third century ce) in Dig. 19.1.32 on using false weights.
56 See, e.g., Dig. 29.5.14; 32.9; 32.11.2; 32.11.15; 32.13; 32.15; 32.17; 35.1.86; 35.1.91; 35.2.28; 35.2.30; 35.2.32;
57 Dig. 29.5.14. See Fanizza (1982) 115ā“17. Scarano Ussani (1987) 34ā“5, 114, sees a foreshadowing of
Salvio Giulianoā™s teachings, in their turn based on the notion of common interest and aimed at
maintaining social and political order.
220 s era fi n a cuom o
power to dispose by bequest of up to three quarters of oneā™s substance,
thus: ā˜Suppose that Titiusā™s share is reduced in a legacy of twenty through
the Falcidian law, Titius himself being charged to give ļ¬ve to Seius; . . . a
proportional reduction is to be made in Seiusā™s ļ¬ve comparable to that in
Titiusā™s twenty. This decision is both more just and more reasonable.ā™58 A
slightly different approach is revealed in another fragment, on the Rhodian
law of jettison: ā˜Volusius Maecianus, From the Rhodian Law: Petition of
Eudaemon of Nicomedia to the Emperor Antoninus: āAntoninus, Ruler
and Lord, we were shipwrecked in Icaria and robbed by the people of the
Cycladesā. Antoninus replied to Eudaemon: āI am master of the world, but
the law of the sea must be judged according to the sea law of the Rhodians
when our own law does not contradict itā.ā™59 Finally, on the topic of money,
Maecianus, again commenting on the Falcidian law, deals with the compli-
cations of legacies and bequests in cases where a bequest has been speciļ¬ed
in kind or in weight, number or measurement (as in ā˜three talents of silverā™,
rather than ā˜the silver which I have in the warehouseā™), and what happens
when the goods become damaged before the heirs come into them. The
question, indirectly, is again about the dialectic between pecunia, a valuable
body, and counted (ā˜numerataā™) pecunia: not just ā˜coinedā™ money but (to
stretch the sense) valuables that have been expressed ā˜by weight, number
and measuringā™ (pondere numero mensura).60
Maecianusā™ fragments encapsulate a number of questions that were being
debated in second-century law. One is the ontological status of money, and
how that affects everyday transactions. For example, Gaius considers the
case of whether, in a sale, the price agreed must be in counted money
(pecunia numerata) or can be in other items, such as a slave, a piece of land
or a toga. Gaiusā™ teachers thought that it could, because they thought that
since time immemorial (and Homer is quoted in Greek to this effect) an
exchange (permutatio) is a sale. The authorities of Proculus say, however,
that exchange and sale are different: ā˜In particular, they think it impossible
in an exchange of goods to determine which thing has been sold and
which given as price; they see it as absurd, again, that each thing should
be regarded as both sold and paid as the priceā™.61 The question, it seems
to me, revolves around whether ā˜counted pecuniaā™ is the only stable way to
effect a transaction. According to the second opinion, the lack of a measure
throws the whole process into confusion. Pecunia by itself is disorderly and
58 Dig. 35.2.32.
59 Dig. 14.2.9. The central passage can also be translated: ā˜I am master of the world, but the law is
mistress of the seaā™; cf. Manfredini (1983).
60 61 Gai., Inst. 3.141.
Dig. 188.8.131.52ā“5, from book 8 of Maecianusā™ Fideicommissa.
Maecianusā™ monetary pamphlet for Marcus 221
difļ¬cult to manage; its numerical stand-in has, in a sense, become more
real than the real thing. But we should not forget that there are contrasting
A remarkable passage by Paul (late second to early third century ce)
states the terms of the question even more explicitly: ā˜Buying and selling
started from exchange. Once in fact there was no coined money (nummus)
and it did not happen that one thing was called āwaresā and the other
āpriceā . . . But since it did not always and easily happen that when you
had something which I wanted, I, for my part, had something that you
were willing to accept, a material was chosen, the ofļ¬cial and permanent
assessment of whose value would remedy the problems in exchanges thanks
to the uniformity of quantity. That material, struck with an ofļ¬cial ļ¬gure,
demonstrates its utility and dominion not so much on the basis of its substance
as of its quantity, so that no longer are the things exchanged both called
wares but one of them is termed the priceā™ (emphasis added).62 The fact
that money now has a value that depends not on its substance, but on a
convention, ratiļ¬ed by the ofļ¬cial ļ¬gure struck on it, is the result of what
we have called an inscription process. Pecunia numerata has almost become
the reality by this time, and the jurists, including Maecianus, are engaged
in reconstructing the genealogy of their present situation.
In practice, a lot of the money that the Distributio discusses only existed
in the form of signs and names. It has been observed that small units of
currency would have been little used in antiquity because the as ā˜would
have been adequate for many of the purchases of everyday lifeā™.63 A cursory
look at what we know of actual prices from the Roman Empire reveals, in
the East, ļ¬gures of 1/24 of a denarius and 1/48 of a denarius for bread.64 The
grafļ¬ti in Pompeii mention uncia and semiuncia, even though the context
seems jocular,65 more frequently semisses66 and most frequently of all asses.
Often there are numbers, or even itemised bills, with no indication of what
unit is being referred to. A couple of inscriptions67 might have the symbol
for scrupulus. There are also occurrences of what could be a sicilicus, and
perhaps of quadrans. One could debate how representative these scattered
testimonies are, and how tentative our reading of currency symbols, but
overall there does seem to be a mismatch between the small bronze that may
have been in circulation in antiquity and our ļ¬nds of small bronze, a gap
62 Dig. 18.1.1 (Paul Edict 33). Paul continues with a discussion which is almost identical to the one in
Gaius, Inst. 3.141, and ends up siding with Proculusā™ school.
63 64 Sperber (1974) 118ā“19. 65 CIL 4.4227.
Howgego (1992) 19.
66 E.g., CIL 4.8561, 4.8565, 4.8566, 4.8789, 4.8968 (in Greek with price in Latin).
67 CIL 4.2029, 4.2030.
222 s era fi n a cuom o
wider than in the case of silver and gold coinage. This is hardly surprising, if
we consider that smaller coins are found as isolated and casual ļ¬nds rather
than as part of hoards. Their lesser value means that they would not have
been treasured, and not actively sought if lost.68
Even providing for these accidents of survival, if one examines the dis-
tribution of Roman bronze coins in the Western Empire from 81 to 192 ce,
the presence of ā˜small bronzeā™ (anything smaller than asses, mostly quad-
rantes and a few semisses) is negligible. The quadrans has been found rather
sporadically, more on Italian sites than in the northern provinces. The only
surviving examples of semuncia, quartuncia, sextans, triens, quincunx, and
bes coins date from the third or second century bce.69 Overall, the pro-
duction of asses declines and that of sesterces increases from the ļ¬rst to the
second century ce. By Trajanā™s time, the smaller coins (nothing smaller than
quadrantes in any case) may have disappeared because of inļ¬‚ation. In the
Eastern coinage, there are more often smaller coins (obol and smaller, down
to chalkos), but even then, at least in the case of Egypt, the frequency of the
smaller bronze coins seems to decline from around the time of Hadrian.70
The obol seems to have been the smallest unit actually used in tax receipts
and private accounts in Egypt, but there is also second-century evidence
from Karanis that a very small unit, the dichalcon, was in use in tax receipts
and ledgers, probably as an accounting device.71
At least in the case of the subdivisions of the uncia Maecianus is therefore
talking about ā˜symbolicā™, accountant money, used in calculations, not about
money, mea su re an d t he em pe ror
There is a practical aspect to measured wealth: if one agrees on standard
weights or lengths, or at least on exchange systems, transactions and transla-
tions are made possible. Metrology allows control, a certain degree of order
68 Savio (2001) 160, 186.
69 Mattingly (1928); Hobley (1998), esp. 12ā“14. For money units smaller than the as, see Crawford (1985)
60ā“5; Burnett (1987) 95ā“7. On the problems of calculating coinage output, see Howgego (1992);
Duncan-Jones (1994) 95ā“247; Savio (2001) 50, 303ā“8. Also useful are Strack (1937); Sear (2000).
70 West and Johnson (1967) 18ā“20.
71 West and Johnson (1967) 17ā“18, 20ā“1. Rathbone (1991) 318ā“30 describes a system (Egypt, third
century ce) which is basically monetised without necessarily using actual coins.
72 Mrozek (2001) 9, 94ā“101 argues that the ā˜abstractnessā™ of money was evident since at least late
Republican times, because people invested and made debts, sometimes debts so huge that they
could not possibly be paid back. A potentially inļ¬nite debt cannot correspond to actual, material,
amounts of money. There was the idea, thanks to debit, interest and proļ¬t (faenus) that money, even
when expressed in the language of money units, does not necessarily exist in the form of coins.
Maecianusā™ monetary pamphlet for Marcus 223
and centralisation. On the other hand, the signiļ¬cance of measures lies in
the fact that they are symbols. Because the relation between things and their
representation is not immediate or univocal, any decision concerning that
relation is invested with a special authority,73 which can be religious and/or
political. For instance, in the Middle Ages in parts of Europe measures
of grain were established by the king, supported by his God-given power,
and they acquired a sacred character; breaking them was akin to sacri-
lege.74 Alternatively, decisions about measures can be based on science,
and justiļ¬ed as reļ¬‚ecting nature itself: Hyginus, a probably ļ¬rst-century
ce land-surveyor, argued that the kardo and decumanus, two perpendicular
lines which were the main reference points when laying out a land-division
grid, were grounded in nothing less than the heavens and the ratio of the
universe.75 Or again, expediency or utility can be invoked in the choice
of one metrological network over another: this seems to have partly moti-
vated Frontinusā™ decision to use the quinaria as standard over the many
other possibilities, because it was the best known, and its subdivisions the
most accurate.76 The difference between recourse to utility and recourse to
science is that the former tends to acknowledge the man-made, artiļ¬cial or
conventional aspect of the decision, which is presented as preferable given
the circumstances, hence somewhat arbitrary, rather than as the most true
or rational thing to do.
We can try to reconstruct what Maecianus may have thought on the
issue. Perhaps his position was contained in the missing part of the treatise.
In the extant text, he does not seem to take a stand on the question of whose
authority is behind the money system he describes. He points out historical
dimensions, the presence of economic interests, hints at local differences,
but the fact that, for instance, the as is divided one way rather than another
is not justiļ¬ed on the basis of nature or even of expediency: it is just given as
a fact. Then again, Maecianus reveals the tentativeness of his arrangement
at more than one point: the treatise is the result of his assessment or opin-
ion (existimavi, 61.17), and his system is one of several possibilities. The
particular order imposed on money may well be a convention, the result
of a choice, a human decision.
Analogous issues were being debated in the legal literature of the second
century ce. The epistemic status of jurisprudence itself was questioned: was
73 See Kula (1986); Hocquet (1992); Porter (1995); Pedroni (1996); Grimaudo (1998); Ercolani Cocchi
74 See Kula (1986).
75 Hyginus 2, Constitutio limitum 134.5ā“6 (Campbell). This kind of position is very common in modern
(post-1800) times: see, e.g., Mirowski (1992); Alder (1995); Schaffer (1995).
76 Frontin. Aq. 1.26ā“37. See Alice KĀØ nig in this volume.
224 s era fi n a cuom o
it ars or scientia? Consequently, could it aim at certainty, or was it bound
to approximation; were its practitioners technical experts or did they have
to derive their authority from their political clout? Crucially, what did the
law rest on?77 Various possibilities were mooted. Tradition was one ground
for justiļ¬cation, and one that seems to have been quite powerful in various
areas of Roman culture, although it was far from being unquestioned,
especially in the period we are talking about. The notion of ā˜use valueā™
(utilitas), often invoked in extant decisions, was far from self-explanatory:
the common good was not pellucid, but had to be determined by someone
with some sort of authority. The existence of a rationality internal to the law,
ultimately congruent with human rationality, and reļ¬‚ecting, if imperfectly,
the orderliness of the universe, was also a possibility. We have looked at
Maecianusā™ own mentions of ratio (reason, ā˜rationaleā™). In fact, attempts to
deļ¬ne a ratio for law (a ratio iuris), and to use it as an underlying, unifying
principle have been traced in Roman jurists from at least Pomponius, a
contemporary of Maecianus, to the third century ce. Especially in Gaiusā™
work, there is often a juxtaposition of two rationes, a natural one and a
civic, political one, which ideally should work together.78 When that is not
possible, it is suggested that nature should prevail.79 Celsus clearly states:
ā˜[Testaments] which are forbidden by nature are not endorsed by any lawā™.80
Underlying this distinction is the notion of a ā˜law common to all peoplesā™
(ius gentium). Its identiļ¬cation with a sort of ā˜natural lawā™ (ius naturale)
is debatable, but, even if the ā˜law common to all peoplesā™ is the product
of convention, then it is a more natural and universal convention than
that at the basis of the ā˜civil lawā™ (ius civile), which only binds a speciļ¬c
A good example of the debate is the case of the entitlements of the head of
the household (pater familias). Jurists of the second and third centuries ce
were very aware that the power exerted by the father in a Roman household
was a peculiarity of Roman law, i.e., part of their ā˜civil lawā™, but it was not
77 Casavola (1980) 54ā“7; Bretone (1982) 42ā“3, 268ā“70; Scarano Ussani (1987) 21ā“5 and (1997) parts 1
and 3; Ducos (1994).
78 As they do in Dig. 3.5.38, by Gaius (mid- to late second century ce). Cf. also Gai. Inst. 1.1; 1.89; 2.66;
Dig. 8.2.8; 9.4; 184.108.40.206; 41.1.3; 220.127.116.11; 18.104.22.168 (all mentioning naturalis ratio, all by Gaius).
79 See, e.g., Gai. Inst. 1.158, ratio civilis and civilia iura v. naturalia iura; Dig. 4.5.8, civilis ratio v. naturalia
iura; Dig. 7.5.2, naturalis ratio v. the authority of the senate; Dig. 41.1.1, where the ius gentium, based
on naturalis ratio, is declared older than the ius civile, ā˜being the product of human nature itself ā™.
All the Dig. texts mentioned are by Gaius.
80 Dig. 22.214.171.124. Celsus also lived in the second century ce. See also Nocera (1962); Levy (1963);
Stein (1974); Archi (1981); Scarano Ussani (1979) 198ā“9, 200ā“5 and (1987) 17ā“20; Bretone (1982)
32ā“3 and (1989), esp. 323ā“51; Ducos (1994) 5160ā“6. For contemporary discussions on whether words
are the product of nature or convention, see, e.g., Gell. NA 10.4.
Maecianusā™ monetary pamphlet for Marcus 225
found among other peoples, i.e., not in the ā˜law common to all peoplesā™, and
thus arguably it was not based on nature. Its main strength was tradition,
but in the course of the second century emperors like Hadrian seemed
increasingly willing to put tradition on the side in the name of a different
conception of what was legally the right thing to do. On the imperial
scene, the sphere of application of any civil law to peoples other than the
one that created it required some sort of justiļ¬cation: in metrological terms,
in a situation where different units of measure exist, in order to establish
a standard, appeal has to be made to something, be it practicality or the
claim that the chosen standard is more rational or more natural than the
In sum, I would argue that Maecianusā™ approach to the subdivisions
of money reļ¬‚ects contemporary legal debates. Jurists were concerned with
the ambiguous nature of money; they, and Maecianus as one of them,
reļ¬‚ect a situation where at least to some extent the link between thing and
symbol has been problematised, weakened or even severed. Again, jurists
were trying to put order in the law, and ground it ļ¬rmly on a basis of nature,
rationality or convention, creating standards, mapping out relations, cases
and subcases; Maecianus was trying to do the same in the domain of money.
In both cases, history and individual circumstances often got in the way;
in both cases, the presence of a supreme authority loomed large in the
background: the emperor.
Where did the emperor stand in relation to the law: was he himself
subject to it? The question had been discussed throughout the ļ¬rst century
and seemed to be more or less settled in the second century ce, with the
emperor emerging as the ultimate legal expert.81 Complications remained,
however, as shown by a deliberation process about the inheritance rights
of patrons towards freedmen reported by Ulpian and involving Marcus
Aurelius and Lucius Verus, Maecianus himself and other jurist friends:
ā˜We . . . followed this opinion (sententiam) when we dispatched a rescript
in answer to the petition of Caesidia Longina; but likewise, our friend
Volusius Maecianus, careful custodian of the civil law, apart from his long
and well-grounded expertise in it, was induced by respect for our rescript
to declare in our presence that he did not think he ought to say otherwise.
But when we discussed the matter more fully with Maecianus himself and
other legal experts also friends of ours, who had been summoned, it seemed
rather that neither the words nor the meaning (sententia) of the law nor the
praetorā™s edict excluded the grandson from the property of his grandfatherā™s
81 Bretone (1989) 234ā“7.
226 s era fi n a cuom o
freedman; and that such was the view of several legal authorities too, but that
it had also been the opinion (sententia) of our friend, the most honourable
Several factors are in play here: legal expertise on the part of various
individuals, all reassuringly denoted as ā˜oursā™ (noster or nostri); the literal
and not strictly literal interpretation of the law; the edict of a praetor who
would have been a member of the Senate and possibly the representative
of a political authority other than that of the emperor; the emperorsā™ own
opinion. There has been some debate about Maecianusā™ demeanour in this
case: for some, he was being too subservient to the decision of the emperors,
for others, he was just being professional, the perfect lawyer-bureaucrat with
no political identity, since the imperial will was in fact legally binding.83
In any case, it is clear that behind the amicable appearances, ever since
Augustus the emperor was the gatekeeper on legal expertise: without his
sanction, no expert had the authority to express binding legal opinions.84
In the passage above, the emperors mediate the various sources of authority.
Their expertise consists in eventually choosing whose expertise ought to be
applied to the case in hand.
Rather than having the debate about the origin and justiļ¬cation of legal
or metrological order, nature (physis) vs. culture (nomos), explicitly trans-
ferred onto himself, then, the emperor emerges as a ļ¬gure who stands above
others. Take the case of Maecianusā™ fragment on the Rhodian law: because
Antoninus Pius is the acknowledged master of the universe, he can sanction
the application of a legal order, the law of the sea, other than the normal one.
Again, some legislation introduced by Hadrian and Antoninus Pius seems
to point in the direction of greater humanity towards women, children
oppressed by paternal right (patria potestas) and slaves. This has been seen
as a reļ¬‚ection of the greater attention they paid to non-Roman laws and
customs, which in its turn would be the reļ¬‚ection of a lesser role for Rome
as a city in the empire and a greater awareness of the multiculturalism of
the empire. The ļ¬‚ip side is, in advocating power of interpretation over the
law common to all peoples (ius gentium) rather than just over civil law (ius
civile), the emperor was reafļ¬rming his power over the extended domain
of the entire world.85 To put it in metrological terms, while acknowledging
82 Dig. 37.14.17. Cf. Bretone (1989) 219.
83 Cf. Amarelli (1983) 88ā“9; Scarano Ussani, (1987) 75ā“6 and n. 86, with further references.
84 Bretone (1989) 198, 200, 211ā“13. Bauman (1989) 236ā“7, 301ā“2 thinks that part of the story behind
Hadrianā™s emphasis on juridical administration, reform and greater role for the consilium principis is
the fact that he wanted to weaken the role of the praetor, and through that indirectly of the senate
and of the senatus consulta.
85 Echoes of some of these issues in Dio Chrys. Or. 15.20 (mid- to late ļ¬rst century ce); Plut. De sera
550b (late ļ¬rst century to early second century ce); Aristid., Ad Romam 102ā“3 (155 ce). Casavola
Maecianusā™ monetary pamphlet for Marcus 227
the existence and utility of other standards, the emperor posited himself
as the supreme measure, to which the others were required to refer in case
of conļ¬‚ict or when mediation was needed. The process itself by which the
emperor became a super-standard can be seen as a kind of inscription device
that began with Augustus himself. Even at the level of ritual ā“ through his
visage on coins, and the presence of his name and the events of his individ-
ual life within the ofļ¬cial calendar ā“ the emperor was originally ofļ¬cially a
ļ¬gurehead for the senate and the people of Rome. This link between impe-
rial power and ā˜realā™ sources of authority was gradually erased, until the
emperor could stand outside debates on rationality, nature or convention
because he was not standing in for any further source of authority. From a
sort of stand-in he became the ultimate reality of authority.
From this perspective, the fact that the coinage for the Western part
of the Empire was in this period and until 192 ce issued from a single
centre, the mint of Rome, acquires some signiļ¬cance.86 Indeed, in mere
economic terms Maecianus implies a situation (and this will become more
and more the case in late antiquity) where the coin is valuable not so
much because of its ā˜realā™ value (gold or silver or bronze), but because it is
inscribed in a complex trust system, ultimately guaranteed by the state, i.e.
the emperor.87 Or at least it should be. The grounding of order in economics
as in law was ultimately contested, subject to recalcitrant moneylenders,88
the vicissitudes of history and the contingencies of geography. Conļ¬‚icts
ensued which had to be solved: in fact, in land-surveying as in law, most
of the administration from the late ļ¬rst century ce seems to be negotiating
disputes on the interpretation of previous land-divisions or previous legal
decisions.89 It was in order to measure up to alternative sources of expertise
or authority that Marcus Aurelius had to know about the law, and he had
to know about money: so that he could afford, like Columella and like the
architect described by Columella, not to be an expert, and thus supersede
jurists and accountants (ratiocinatores) alike.
conc lu si on
Different peoples will have different measures: some Italic populations used
a ten-unit based system for the as, which was abandoned by the Romans and
(1980) 215, 222, 226; Marotta (1988) 73ā“9; van der Waerdt (1994); Amarelli (1996); de Giovanni
(1996); Scarano Ussani (1997). Scarano Ussani (1979) 134, 154ā“5, 200, describes ā˜a critical attitudeā™
towards traditional Roman legal institutions on the part of members of the ruling class.
86 87 Cf. Savio (2001) 21. 88 POxy. 1411 (260 ce).
Hobley (1998) 1. Cf. also Dio Cass. 52.30.9.
89 Salvius Julianus manifests awareness of a conļ¬‚ict between some imperial decisions and the ratio iuris
according to Scarano Ussani (1987) 150ā“2.