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77“84. Edited by Clinton Rossiter.
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Moore, Michael. 1992. “Moral Reality Revisited.” 90 Michigan Law Review 2424“2533.
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Paske, Gerald. 1989. “Rationality, Reasonableness, and Morality.” 10 Logos: Philosophic
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Patterson, Dennis. 2006. “Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation.” 29
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Pettit, Philip. 2001 . “Embracing Objectivity in Ethics.” In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objec-
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Williams, Glanville. 1956. “The Concept of Legal Liberty.” 56 Columbia Law Review
1129“50.
Index




administrative and adjudicative discretion, contradictions destructive of, 162“3
25“33 law™s connection to, 183“4
adversarial procedures, 60“1 and perspicuity, 157“8
aleatory procedures, 62“3 and prospectivity of laws, 154, 155
inappropriateness of in judicial settings, and steadiness over time, 170“1
63
Allan, T. R. S., 234 biblical view of rape, 90
Altman, Andrew, 234 Bix, Brian, 22n8, 237
antiquated laws, 171 “3 Blackburn, Simon, 96n19, 237
appellate cases, 16“17, 141 “2 borderline instances, 37, 70, 107“8
archetype, 105“9, 122, 124, 132, 184 Brink, David, 233
ascertainability, contrasted with
ascertainment, 115“16, 118, 150 Canadian English, 4“5
“authoritative materials,” de¬nition of, categorical imperativeness, 38“41
126n2 circles
Authoritativeness-cum-Determinacy mathematical conception of, 105“6, 107,
Doctrine, 193, 212 109
Authoritativeness Doctrine, 189“216, 218, 225 ordinary conception of, 106“8
truth and misleadingness of, 189“93, clarity as scalar property, 105, 107“8, 109,
201 “02, 206“12, 218 122
autonomy, 144, 151 cognitive reliability, 99
con¬‚icts destructive of, 158“61 of impartiality, 64“5, 68, 134“5 173“4


241
242 Index


Coleman, Jules, 22n8, 64n13, 193nn1 “2, desuetude, 32, 136
216“24, 237 determinacy
common law, 115 demonstrability contrasted with, 17“18,
common-law rules, 116 35, 50“3, 124, 226
common-sense assumptions, 34“5, 140, 142 observational mind-independence
compliability, principle of, 130“2 contrasted with, 227
as moral ideal, 164“70 predictability contrasted with, 18“19,
salutary departures from, 130“1 , 167 26“7, 128
strict liability consistent with, 168“70 as scalar property, 193, 202
con¬‚icts, 125, 127, 129“30 transindividual discernibility contrasted
moral drawbacks of, 125, 158“61 , 164 with, 202“5
occasional innocuousness of, 159“62 uncertainty contrasted with, 124
congruity, principle of, 134“42, 166 determinate correctness
and avoidance of indeterminacy, 138“9 and corrigibility, 92
impartiality as key element in, 134“5, Dworkin on, 33“6
173“81 , 187 necessary for law™s moral authority,
as moral ideal, 173“83 193“4, 201 “30
steadiness over time in tension with, objectivity as, 14“38
133“4 transindividual discernibility contrasted
contracts, formation of, 154, 159“60, 167“8 with, 48, 50“3
contradictions Deuteronomy, 90
apparent versus genuine, 126, 128 dignity of individual, 144
autonomy ¬‚outed by, 162“3 disagreements among legal of¬cials,17“18, 35,
con¬‚icts distinguished from, 125“30 49
and indeterminacy, 128“9, 162, 208“10, Waldron on, 224“30
214“18, 222“4 discretion, 14
legitimate expectations dashed by, 163 in law-administration, 25“33, 65, 137
moral drawbacks of, 161 “4 disinterestedness
uncertainty engendered by, 162 dif¬culties of attainment of, 55“7
conventionality of law, 12“13 impartiality as, 53, 54“8
correspondence theory of truth in legislative branch, 57“8
crude version of, 76 dispute-resolving role of law, 131 “2
de¬‚ationary version of, 73“4, 76 disquotational account of truth, 71 “82
corrigibility, 91 “2 Druidism, 77, 81
cosmology, 49“50, 204 due process, 148, 149
courts, institutional separateness of, 185 Duncan, Helen, 172
Craig, Paul, 102, 237 duty-imposing laws, 39“40, 154
Creationism, 77, 80“82 Duxbury, Neil, 62, 237
criminal law Dworkin, Ronald, 237“8
and enforcement, 26“33 on conventionality of law, 13n4
and nonretroactivity, 120 on determinate correctness, 33“6
Critical Legal Studies,16, 22, 25, 32, 33, 38, 141 , on nonscalar character of legal regimes,
219, 234“5 107
customary norms as laws, 116 on uncertainty versus indeterminacy,
20n7
D-Day, 172
de¬nite descriptions, 146“9 economic ef¬ciency, 154“5, 171
demonstrability, contrasted with Egyptian magic, 51 “2
determinacy, 17“18, 35, 50“3, 124, 226 empathy, 63“4
desiderata resulting from law, 147, 150“1 , 155, empirical ¬ndings in legal decision-making,
161 , 170, 172, 175, 179 79“80
Index 243


Endicott, Timothy, 22n8, 36, 70, 238 155, 156, 161 , 164, 165, 170, 175, 178“9,
“epistemic,” elucidation of, 2, 46“7, 53 183“4
epistemic objectivity indeterminacy at odds with, 210“12, 229
scalar character of, 47 reliant on transindividual discernibility,
transindividual discernibility as, 46“53 204
epistemic reliability; see cognitive reliability
equality, 144, 160, 180 Hare, R. M., 145, 238
and generality in the Rule of Law, 148, Harman, Gilbert, 234
149 Harris, J. W., 75n16, 185, 238
impartiality essential for, 179“80 Hart, H. L. A., 238
law-enforcement sometimes inconsistent on generality of laws, 109
with, 180 on guiding function of law, 132
negated by sel¬shness, 176 on minimum content of natural law,
equal protection of the laws, 32, 51 89“91
Exclusive Legal Positivists, 224 on nonscalar character of legal regimes,
existential mind-independence, 5“8, 11 “13 107
Exodus, 90 on power/duty distinction, 39
Hayek, Friedrich, 144, 234
facts, minimalist account of, 77 hierarchical structure of legal systems, xii
fair notice, 151 , 154, 155, 156“8 Hills, Alison, 83, 238
fallibility of legal of¬cials, 78“9 Hitler, Adolf, 155
Fine, Kit, 94, 238 Hohfeld, Wesley, 27
Finnis, John, 234, 235 Holton, Richard, 71 n15, 227n3, 238
Freeman, Michael, 75n16, 238 honesty, 152
Fuller, Lon, 190“1 , 238 Horwich, Paul, 71 n15, 72, 73, 238
hostility of toward legal positivism, 103 Hume, David, 23“4
on principles of legality, 103“43 Hybrid Authoritativeness Doctrine, 195, 201
on principles of legality as moral ideals,
143“86 ignorance, 178“9; see also whimsicalness
on purposes in legal interpretation, 140 illiteracy, 117“18
on retroactivity, 154 illusions, 92“3
on supposedly scalar character of legal impartiality
systems, 107 and corrigibility, 92
as disinterestedness, 54“8
generality empathy consistent with, 63“4
of address, 109“13 epistemic reliability of, 64“5, 68, 134“5,
of application, 109“11 , 112 173“4
in tension with perspicuity, 108“9, 124, fairness of, 65“8
156, 158 law-enforcement sometimes inconsistent
universality contrasted with, 145“50 with, 180“1
generality, principle of, 109“13, 144 legitimate expectations satis¬ed by, 175
as moral ideal, 144“50 moral grounds for, 64“8, 174“81
salutary departures from, 147 necessary for congruity,134“5, 173“81 , 187
general laws, weak existential mind- necessary for equality, 179“80
independence of, 6“8, 11 “13 neutrality contrasted with, 53“4
gray areas, 37, 70 objectivity as, 53“68, 231
Green, Michael, 22n8, 238 as open-mindedness, 58“64
Greenawalt, Kent, 9n3, 19n6, 22n8, 25n10, as scalar property, 100, 188
41 n11 , 84n17, 238 and susceptibility to reasons, 98“9
guiding and coordinating function of law, imperatives, 70n14, 76
110“19, 122“3, 127“33, 137, 139, 146, 150, no truth-values of, 69, 70, 75
244 Index


incommensurability, 19 Kant, Immanuel, 144
Dworkin™s doubts about, 36 Kantianism, 82
indeterminacy resulting from, 220“4, Kress, Kenneth, 235
226
indeterminacy, 14“33, 220“4, 226 Landers, Scott, 22n8, 239
avoidability of, 222 law
comprehensive versus cabined, 217“20, conventionality of, 12“13
224, 228“30 desiderata resulting from, 147, 150“1 , 155,
engendered by contradictions, 128“9, 162, 161 , 170, 172, 175, 179
208“11 , 214“8, 222“4 mind-independence of, 6“14, 21 , 188“230
engendered by failures of congruity, 138“9 objectivity of, 1 “3
engendered by failures of perspicuity, lawmaking, analogized to schoolteaching,
207“8, 211 , 214“15, 217“18, 221 “2 167
guiding role of law impaired or negated laws of logic, 89
by, 210“12, 229 laws of nature, 89
limitedness of, 63 legal change, limits on, 88, 132“4
reasoned justi¬cations sometimes legal experts
consistent with, 220“4 as benchmarks for comprehensibility of
as scalar property, 15, 217 laws, 123, 157
second-order variety of, 33 impartiality promoted by, 60“1
strong observational mind-dependence information and advice provided by,
generative of, 201 “7, 210“11 , 213“14, 117“18, 123, 157
217“18, 221 “2, 226, 229“30 legal interpretation
uncertainty contrasted with, 19“21 , 157 con¬‚icts often ¬nessed by, 159, 160
unpredictability contrasted with, 18“19, diversity of approaches to, 139“40
26“7, 211 mistakes in, 9“12
Waldron on, 224“30 of¬cials™ pro¬ciency in, 135, 139“42, 181 “3
individual dignity, 160 purposes as focus of, 140“1
individualized directives, 110, 111 , 113, 147 legal norms
potential moral drawbacks of, 148“50 as justi¬catory bases for decisions, 195,
strong existential mind-dependence of, 212“16, 220“4, 226, 229“30
6, 7 moral principles as, 80“1 , 224
induction, 23“4 strong observational mind-independence
inescapable impermissibility, 158“9, 160“1 of, 8“12, 78“9
inquisitorial procedures, 60“1 weak existential mind-independence of,
insurance, 42“3 3“8, 49, 50
interjections, 69, 75 legal positivism
Internal Standards Doctrine, 78“81 and conventionality of law, 12“13
interpretive pro¬ciency, 181 “3 Fuller on, 103
invariance, 86“91 , 101 “3 legal powers, 27“8, 39“40
inapplicable to rule of law, 101 “3 Legal Realism, 15“16, 75, 141
as strong observational mind- legal validity, 136“7
independence, 87 legislative intentions, 140“1
as transindividual discernibility, 86“7 legislatures, 57“8, 67“8
as ubiquity, 88“91 legitimate expectations, 154“5, 163, 175, 180,
as unchangingness, 87“91 181 “2
as uniform applicability, 86 Leiter, Brian, 22n8, 64n13, 99, 193nn1 “2,
irrationality, 84“6 216“24, 233, 239
liability to be punished, 27“9, 30, 32, 38
jaywalking mandates, 7“8, 136, 180“1 , 219 liberal democracy, 143“4
jury service, 63 liberty, 144, 165
Index 245


Lincoln, Abraham, 71 “2, 145 neutrality
linguistic norms, 4“5 contrasted with impartiality, 53“4
lobbying of legislatures, 57“8 contrasted with uniform applicability,
Locke, John, 9n3, 144, 239 45“6
logical incoherence, 82“6 Night of the Long Knives, 155
Lucy, William, 53n12, 54, 61 , 239 noncon¬‚ictingness and
noncontradictoriness, principle of,
Madison, James, 58, 239 125“30
Maoism, 77, 80, 81 categorical force of, 163“4
Marmor, Andrei, 239 as moral ideal, 158“64
on impartiality, 53n12 Noncontradiction, Law of, 23, 24, 82
and incoherence, 9“10, 200“1 nonillusiveness, 92“6
on law™s observational mind- nonscalar character of strong observational
independence, 8“11 , 194“201 mind-independence, 188“9, 191 “2,
mathematical de¬nitions, 105“9 202, 217, 232
mathematics, 22, 49 Nozick, Robert, 86, 144, 239
McDowell, John, 93, 94, 96, 239
meaningful declarative statements, 68“73, 77 objectivity, 1 “100
medical care, 62“3 as cognitive reliability, 99
Mill, John Stuart, 144 as corrigibility, 91 “2
mind-independence, 3“14 as determinate correctness, 14“38
existential, 5“8, 11 “13 as impartiality, 53“68, 231
illusions marked by absence of, 93 as invariance, 86“91 , 101 “3
observational, 5“6, 8“12 as mind-independence, 3“14
of response-centered properties, 94“6 as nonillusiveness, 92“6
weak versus strong, 3“5, 6“14 overarching unity of, xi“xii
minimalist account of facts, 77 as rational compellingness, 82“6
minimalist account of truth, 71 “82, 227n3 as susceptibility to reasons, 96“9
mistakes in legal decision-making, 9“12, 79 as transindividual discernibility, 46“53
potential salutariness of, 198 as truth-aptitude, 68“82, 231
precedential force of, 10“11 , 79, 182, 196 as uniform applicability, 38“46, 231
probable rarity of, 197“8 obligation to obey the law, 85“6
reversibility of, 198“201 obscurity, unwarrantedness of, 157“8
Moore, Michael, 5n2, 193n1 , 239 observational mind-independence, 5“6, 8“12
moral judgments, 80“1 and corrigibility, 91
moral principles determinacy distinguished from, 227
as laws, 80“1 , 224 as nonscalar property, 100, 188“9, 191 “2,
strong existential mind-independence of, 202, 217, 232
13“14 “ontological,” elucidation of, 2, 53
strong observational mind-independence open-mindedness, 53, 58“64
of, 81 , 192 in legal systems, 60“4
timelessness of, 87“8 “ought”-implies-“can” principle, 42, 165,
Murphy, Mark, 234 169“70
outcome-centered promulgation of laws,
Nagel, Thomas, 234 113“15, 137“8
naturalistic ontology, 75“6
natural-law theory, 12“14 pain, 195
Nazis, 155 paradoxical statements, 69, 71 , 72, 78
Nazism, 77, 80, 81 particularity
negligence standard, uniform applicability potential moral drawbacks of, 145“9
of, 41 “5, 130, 165“6 speci¬city contrasted with, 145“6
246 Index


Paske, Gerald, 84n17, 239 racial segregation, 51
Patterson, Dennis, 22n8, 239 radical reference failures, 69“70, 72, 73,
perspicuity, principle of, 122“4, 130 78
indeterminacy resulting from breaches rape, 90
of, 207“8, 211 , 214“18, 221 “2 rational compellingness, 82“6
as moral ideal, 156“8 Rawls, John, 144, 234
in tension with principle of generality, Raz, Joseph, 91 , 99, 141 , 234, 239
108“9, 124, 156, 158 reasoned justi¬cations, 220“4
and transindividual discernibility, 231 “2 recidivism, 61
Pettit, Philip, 96, 239 regularity, 111 , 112
philosophical ineptitude of judges, 199“200 Reiff, Mark, xii, 239
political participation, 144 representative function of legislatures, 57“8,
Postema, Gerald, 97“8, 239 67
power-conferring laws, 39“40 response-centered properties, 93“6
precedent, 10“11 revenue-neutrality, 46
precedential force Rosati, Connie, 91 , 193n1 , 240
of de-novo decisions, 52 routineness of most legal decisions, 16“17,
of mistaken decisions, 10“11 , 79, 182, 141 “2, 197“8, 203, 228, 229
196 rule-following problems, 22“5
predictability, contrasted with determinacy, rule of law, 101 “43, 183“6
18“19, 26“7, 128 moral neutrality of, 1 , 102“3, 143, 190“1
prejudices, 58“9 presupposed by Rule of Law, 183
cognitive unreliability of, 134“5, 173“4 two varieties of, 102“4
moral perniciousness of, 176“8 Rule of Law, 1 , 143“86
prejudicial evidence, 61 “2 rules of closure, 33, 120
presuppositional failures, 69“70, 71 , 78 Russell, Bertrand, 73
principles of legality, 103“43
as ideals of political morality, 143“83 Sainsbury, R. M., 37, 240
imperfect ful¬llment of, 105, 118“21 , 124 scalar status
scalar properties distilled by, 191 of determinacy and indeterminacy, 15,
threshold level of satisfaction of, 105, 107, 193, 202, 217
109, 122, 124, 125, 128“9, 139, 191 of epistemic objectivity, 100
private-law adjudication, 42“3, 119“21 of Fuller™s principles, 191
procedural justice, 32 supposedly of the property of being a
prospectivity, principle of, 118“22, 130 legal system, 106“8
as moral ideal, 154“5 of transindividual discernibility, 47, 202,
salutary departures from, 119“22 232
and transindividual discernibility, Scandinavian Legal Realism, 75“6
231 “2 Schauer, Frederick, 22n8, 240
public ascertainability, principle of, 113“18, Scientology, 77, 78, 81 , 82
130, 150 schoolteaching, 167
absence of, 137 second-order beliefs, 9“11 , 21 , 79, 197
as moral ideal, 150“3 second-order indeterminacy, 33
and transindividual discernibility, 231 “2 self-interestedness
public practical reasoning, 96“9, 144 cognitive unreliability of, 134“5, 173“4
public scrutiny of legal governance, 151 “3 equality negated by, 176
punishment “semantic,” elucidation of, 2, 68
gradations of, 38“9, 44 semantic objectivity, 68“82, 231
liability-to-be-punished contrasted with, separation of governmental powers, 144
27“32 Simmonds, N. E., 105“9, 132, 240
purposes, 140“1 skepticism, 15“33
Index 247


Solum, Lawrence, 235 as invariance, 86“7
sorites paradox, 36“7 meagerness of, 225
Sosa, David, 96n19, 240 observational mind-independence
speci¬city contrasted with, 202“5, 210
contrasted with particularity, 145“6 as scalar property, 100, 188, 202, 232
potential moral drawbacks of, 145“50 strong existential mind-independence
stagnancy, 133“4 contrasted with, 48“50
statistical evidence, 61 “2 and susceptibility to reasons, 97“9
Stavropoulos, Nicos, 91 “2, 233, 240 trial by jury, 185
steadiness of law over time, 88 truth-aptitude, 68“82, 231
principle of, 132“4, 170“3 truth-values, 68“82
salutariness of some departures from,
171 “3 ubiquity, 88“91
and transindividual discernibility, 232 uncertainty
strict liability, 168“70 contradictions generative of, 162
“strong,” nonscalar explication of, 188 indeterminacy contrasted with, 19“21 ,
strong observational mind-dependence 124, 157
lack of transindividual discernibility unchangingness, 87“91
contrasted with, 202“5, 210 undetected transgressions, xii, 32
law™s moral authority inconsistent with, unenforced legal requirements, 7“8, 136,
195“6, 201 “30 180“1 , 219
subjectivism of, 202“7, 210“14, 226, uniform applicability, 38“46, 231
229“30 as categorical imperativeness, 38“41
strong observational mind-independence dependent on generality, 111 , 112
as invariance, 87 as invariance, 86
of laws, 8“12, 21 , 78“9, 188“230 neutrality contrasted with, 45“6
of moral principles, 13, 35, 81 in tort law, 41 “5, 130, 165“6
nonscalar character of, 188“9, 191 “2, 202, universality, 145“6
217, 232 unpredictability, 18“19, 26“7, 211
Stroud, Barry, 23n9, 240 unreasonableness, 84“6
subjectivism of strong observational
mind-dependence, 202“7, 210“14, vagueness, 36“7, 70, 71 , 72, 78
226, 229“30 value-pluralism, 36
subjectivity, opposed to objectivity, xii, 3,
66“7, 94 Waldron, Jeremy,192, 193n1 , 216, 224“30, 233,
Summers, Robert, 102, 240 240
susceptibility to reasons, 96“9 “weak,” nonscalar explication of, 188
´ ´
Svavarsdottir, Sigrun, 5n2, 99, 240 Weak Authoritativeness Doctrine, 194, 196,
201
Tamanaha, Brian, 17n5, 19n6, 102, 111 , weak observational mind-independence,
240 194“201
tastiness, 195 whimsicalness, 59, 62, 134, 173“4

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